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Expand nuclear forensics
Characterizing nuclear materials deters illicit trafficking and terrorism, but 
more scientists, techniques and collaborations are needed, says Klaus Mayer.
that it was irradiated in a power plant. 
Nuclear forensics is a small and special-
ized field that has matured since the early 
1990s. But progress is still too slow. Although 
the number of scientific publications in the 
discipline has risen from a handful in 2001, it 
still numbers only a few dozen a year.
States worldwide need to implement 
nuclear-forensic capabilities — both nation-
ally and internationally — through greater 
collaboration. To boost the robustness of 
the methods, and thence their credibility, 
new forms of analysis and signatures for 
nuclear materials need to be developed. 
Nuclear-forensic data need to be archived 
securely and more experts must be trained. 
Otherwise smugglers and terrorists might 
evade prosecution. 
A few years ago in a European country, 
a radiation detector at a scrap-metal recy-
cling facility triggered an alarm. A piece of 
steel in a shipment from south Asia had 
at borders, seaports and airports or in state 
territories by measuring radiation directly or 
acting on tip-offs from police or intelligence 
work. Whenever such a sample is intercepted, 
agencies want to know: which laws have been 
broken? When and where was the material 
produced? What was the intended use? 
Where was the material stolen or diverted? Is 
more of it at large? Nuclear-forensic scientists 
try to answer these questions. 
The chemical and physical signatures of 
a radioactive material — from its appear-
ance and microstructure to its elemental 
and isotopic composition — shed light 
on its origin and history. For example, the 
isotope ratios of strontium impurities in 
a sample of natural uranium may indi-
cate whether it was mined in Australia or 
Namibia. The presence of daughter products 
from nuclear decays reveal the production 
date of the material, and products, such as 
uranium-236, of neutron reactions indicate 
Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implemented its Inci-dent and Trafficking Database in 1995, 
around 2,300 events involving illicit nuclear 
or other radioactive materials have been 
reported. Although most cases involve lost 
or orphan radioactive sources containing, for 
example, cobalt-60 or iridium-192 for medi-
cal or industrial applications, 10–15 incidents 
per year concern nuclear materials turning up 
out of regulatory control. 
Uranium and plutonium are most worry-
ing because, as well as posing a radiological 
hazard, they may be indicative of prolifera-
tion or nuclear terrorism. The sorts of things 
seized are scrap metal contaminated with 
grams of enriched uranium or kilograms of 
natural uranium, gram-sized samples of ura-
nium metal, and uranium fuel pellets. In 1994, 
300 grams of plutonium oxide powder were 
intercepted at Munich airport in Germany.
Officials detect unlawful nuclear materials 
Moldovan police examine suspected radioactive uranium-238 in August 2010.
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a greenish deposit that a rapid on-site 
measurement showed was natural uranium. 
A sample was sent to our nuclear-research 
laboratory in Karlsruhe, Germany, where 
my team and I identified the green material 
as uranium tetrafluoride, an intermediate 
product of uranium processing encountered 
typically during isotope enrichment. Dating 
suggested that it was produced in 1978. But 
chemical impurities, in particular 
the pattern of the rare-Earth ele-
ments (including lanthanum, 
neodymium and samarium), indi-
cated that the uranium came from 
a sandstone subtype found not in 
the suspected country of origin, 
but in China, Australia, Niger or 
the Czech Republic (see ‘Chemical 
impurities’). 
Uranium production in the 
suspected country had, accord-
ing to the literature, started in the 
late 1970s from a different type 
of sandstone. Further literature 
studies revealed that in the same 
period, uranium-ore concentrate 
from Niger, fitting the seized sam-
ple’s characteristics, was imported 
into the suspected country. Thus, 
the origin and history of the 
material showed that uranium 
processing and isotopic enrich-
ment had already been achieved at a very 
early stage in the country’s nuclear activities.
NUCLEAR FINGERPRINT
Chemical and physical signatures vary 
through the nuclear fuel cycle: from uranium 
ore to uranium fuel pellets used in power 
reactors, natural uranium to weapons-usable, 
highly enriched material, and spent nuclear 
fuel to separated plutonium. The variety of 
materials reflects the diverse geological and 
geographic origins of natural uranium, and 
the technological processes that could have 
been applied add to the diversity. 
Analysis methods must be tailored to 
the material and signature under investiga-
tion. Uranium and plutonium samples, for 
instance, contain different chemical impuri-
ties that require different treatments. 
Nuclear-forensic interpretations build 
on a variety of measurements — including 
mass spectrometry, electron microscopy, 
α or γ spectrometry and radiochemical 
separations — that yield a broad spectrum 
of material parameters. These range from 
obvious characteristics such as uranium 
enrichment or pellet dimensions to more 
sophisticated information including metal-
lic impurities or grain-size distribution. 
Age is derived from ratios of progenies of 
radioactive parent nuclides. Most other sig-
natures are comparative, referenced against 
samples of known provenance. Some refer-
ence data, such as the rare-Earth-element 
patterns studied by isotope geologists, are 
openly published. Information such as the 
grain-size distribution in uranium fuel pellets 
can be provided only by the producer. 
There are broader challenges in nuclear 
forensics: new analytical methods need to be 
validated, the robustness of some signatures 
needs to be demonstrated and the interpre-
tational techniques need to be substantiated.
There is no centralized international 
nuclear-forensic database. Indeed, it is 
fiercely resisted by many nations, for under-
standable reasons. Data characterizing 
nuclear materials and processing histories 
are sensitive and may be classified. Sensitivi-
ties can be commercial (in the case of nuclear 
fuels) or security-related (for weapons-grade 
uranium or plutonium). Any compilation of 
data on nuclear material must be secure. 
A decentralized approach is gaining 
acceptance. The concept of national nuclear-
forensic libraries, a combination of databases 
and physical sample archives that allows states 
to control their own nuclear-materials data, 
is being promoted by the IAEA, headquar-
tered in Vienna, and the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
Although few countries have taken official 
steps, Ukraine is developing such a library, 
as are some others in the European Union 
and southeast Asia. Comparing signatures 
of seized material against stored information 
will reveal whether the material is of domestic 
origin. Private queries to other states could 
help to identify the legal owner of the material 
in confidence. 
Yet at the same time, skilled radiochem-
ists, nuclear physicists and nuclear engineers 
with hands-on experience in the nuclear 
fuel cycle and in production or analysis of 
nuclear material have become a rarity, as 
a report by the American Physical Soci-
ety and the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science highlighted (see 
go.nature.com/ckflpx).
Capacity building in nuclear forensics is 
the key issue in forming a global response to 
illicit trafficking and nuclear terrorism. Effec-
tive deterrence does not necessarily imply 
investing enormous budgets to establish 
sophisticated laboratories. Measurements of 
a few parameters may provide enough infor-
mation for law-enforcement pur-
poses. The isotopic composition of 
uranium or plutonium, for instance, 
can be determined using portable 
γ-spectrometry instruments, which 
cost about US$130,000. 
GROW EXPERTISE
Building a nuclear-forensic work-
force requires a scientific educa-
tion in chemistry or physics with 
specialization in radiochemistry, 
nuclear engineering or nuclear 
physics. Hands-on experience 
working with nuclear material and 
analytical techniques comes next. 
Opportunities for graduate and 
postgraduate students to special-
ize in nuclear forensics should be 
offered through university courses 
and through internships and place-
ments in nuclear laboratories.
Training programmes should 
be harmonized and coordinated around the 
world. National and international exercises 
would demonstrate and develop competen-
cies, and check interagency cooperation 
and levels of preparedness. Curricula and 
materials could be reviewed by the Nuclear 
Forensics International Technical Working 
Group — a gathering of nuclear forensics 
practitioners, including scientists and law 
enforcers, founded in 1995 on the initiative 
of the Group of Eight (G8) countries.
Mechanisms need to be developed to 
ensure the security and sharing of informa-
tion about nuclear materials held in national 
databases. The GICNT should promote 
national nuclear-forensic libraries. The 
IAEA, with its expertise in assisting states 
with nuclear security, is well positioned to 
provide technical guidance. 
In March 2014, the international Nuclear 
Security Summit will try to enhance inter-
national cooperation to prevent malicious 
use of nuclear material. These discussions 
must call on the 53 participating nations 
to increase awareness of the opportunities 
that nuclear-forensic science offers to ensure 
nuclear security around the globe. ■
Klaus Mayer is Action Leader for Forensic 
Analysis and Combating Illicit Trafficking 
at the European Commission Joint Research 
Centre, Institute for Transuranium 
Elements, Karlsruhe, Germany. 
e-mail: klaus.mayer@ec.europa.eu
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CHEMICAL IMPURITIES
The signature of rare-Earth elements in natural uranium diers depending on 
the type of ore from which the uranium is mined. The concentration prole of a 
seized sample of nuclear material matches the sandstone type of a mine in Arlit, 
Niger, corroborating information that the material originates from the country.
Beverley mine (Australia) 
Falls City mine (United States) 
Seized sample
Arlit mine (Niger) 
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